Field of Endeavor

This article attempts to find out and/or discuss whether the word, ‘equivalents’, in 35 USC§ 112, ? 6 is equivalent to the word, ‘equivalents’ (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Two Equivalents”), under the nearly internationalized Doctrine of Equivalents.

Background Statement

Among six categories of interpretations in Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary for ‘Two Equivalents,’ it appears that the third one, i.e. “corresponding or virtually identical esp. in effect or function” is the most proper one therefor. The functional claim language, i.e. “means or step plus function” stipulated in 35 USC 112(6) which provides that “an element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents (which word is hereinafter referred to as the former) thereof” is also a US patent practice well-known to the world and was discussed once by this Newsletter to some extent. Under the ‘tri-partite test’ of Doctrine of Equivalents (which word is hereinafter referred to as the latter), we determine whether elements of an accused device (1) perform substantially the same function (2) in substantially the same way to (3) achieve substantially the same result with those of elements or limitations recited in a patent claim. We try to differentiate the former from the latter in a prima facie basis as follows:

1. The former is generally directed to embodiments and their respective equivalents which might generally be structures, materials or acts depending on what embodiments in a relevant specification are;
2. The former normally is a kind of physical embodiment or element or step while the latter is a kind of mentally abstract equivalence or criteria;
3. The former concerns “‘an element’ in a claim for a combination” while the latter deals with ‘elements’ of an accused device. Nevertheless, there are four points deserving us to consider, i.e. 1) an element in a claim for a combination needs not really be a single component where a ‘big’ element might be more complicate than a simple device, 2) although the latter involves in ‘elements’ of an accused device, it appears easily understandable that since every when there is an infringement, it happens normally that there is only one element in an accused device which is controversially the same with or different from a corresponding element recited in a patented claim, 3) the word ‘elements’ is merely the plural form of the word ‘element’ and they do not appear to have much to be distinguished therebetween, and 4) by these analyses, it seems that the gap, if any, between Two Equivalents is greatly shortened;
4. Either the former or the latter are to be discussed at the time of infringing dispute and are not normally minded upon preparing the specification. It is the time after the Donaldson case, people began to consider the former upon preparing the specification while it leaves us no room to consider the latter in the filing or prosecution stage of a patent application. Can we consider that this difference is made by the Donaldson case? Specifically, if there was not the Donaldson case, Two Equivalents might be the same or extremely similar so far as the time factor is concerned. Does the Donaldson case generate rather than solve a problem? Or more exactly, is the effect what the Donaldson case solves the old problem smaller than that of what it brings forth the new problem?
5. Theoretically, the former can be researched or discussed upon preparing the specification. Nevertheless, it will not meaningfully distinguish the former from the latter since one normally does not have a very great drive to research or discuss the former or the latter without a possible or impending infringing issue.

Basing upon the above basic statements, it might be apparent that some sorts of research and development on Two Equivalents might be interesting, meaningful and/or necessary.

Summary of Developments

Not only it is interesting to realize the different meanings of the exactly same single word in the same field but also its realization might help clarify whether it is clever for us to continue using the same word for different purposes.

It is an object of the present article to try to explore whether Two Equivalents are equivalent.

Another object of the present article is tried to find out whether the former should be distinguished from the latter.

A further object of the present article is tried to ascertain whether Two Equivalents should have different imports.

A yet object of the present article is tried to determine whether it is easy to distinguish them from each other.

For these and other objects, let’s first examine the following passages seen in Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co. (983 F.2d 1039, 1043, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451, 1454, 1455, namely:

1. “Equivalents” under § 112, ? 6 invokes the concept of an insubstantial change which adds nothing of significance. This passage would mean that § 112, ? 6 requires that there be at least two corresponding subject matters where:
1. The first corresponding subject matter is different from the second subject matter and possesses some kind of change therefrom;
2. The change between the two subject matters is insubstantial. According to the first one of two meanings for the word “insubstantial’ in the above-mentioned dictionary, it means “not substantial as lacking substance or material nature;”
3. According to the US courts, it appears they believe that the second subject matter is normally ‘intentionally’ changed from the first subject matter, which means that the second subject matter is somehow conceived or created by a person who had the knowledge about the first subject matter. Since if this is not the prerequisite for the ruling reasoning or the ruling background of the US courts, it appears the words ‘insubstantial difference’ instead of ‘insubstantial change’ will be used;
4. The change adds nothing of significance. This sentence in itself is easily understandable and clear but is ambiguous about:
1. While the second subject matter having a change from the first subject matter, which adds nothing of significance when compared therewith, can be regarded with the first subject matter as equivalents, it is unclear whether this remains true if the change subtracts nothing of significance;
2. The reason why we so consider generally originates from the fact that although under the Doctrine of Equivalents in the US practice, there will be no application if there is a missing element, the Japanese patent practice takes it for granted that the Doctrine of Equivalents shall apply if the accused device saves an element in a patented independent claim 1 to perform a deteriorated function. The immediate question will be if the change subtracts nothing of significance, is the answer the same?
3. If the answer to the preceding paragraph is negative, what the situation will be if the change subtracts something of significance?
5. If we agree the word ‘change’ is used because the above assumption is correct, should we change it into ‘difference’? Or, should we agree that the interpretation of § 112, ? 6 is relevant to the accused product? If yes, it will be contrary to the ruling of Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., holding that “in ‘claim construction’ the words of the claims are construed independent of the accused product.”
6. Fairly speaking, if the claims are really to be construed independent of the accused product, it appears to be more natural for us to use ‘insubstantial difference’ rather than ‘insubstantial change’ since the word ‘difference’ will represent that there are two ‘originally’ created subject matters (or embodiments in this context) originating from the same ‘unity of invention’ while the word ‘change’ would hint that the second embodiment is mechanically devised or intentionally changed to be purposefully different from the first embodiment.
2. In the context of § 112, ? 6, “an equivalent results from an insubstantial change which adds nothing of significance to the structure… disclosed in the patent specification.” Perhaps, if the word ‘change’ can be held irrelevant to the subjective intention of a person, the statements in Passage 1 might be controversially correct or wrong. After consulting the above-mentioned dictionary, it seems not easy to take that the ‘insubstantial change’ of the second embodiment is irrelevant to the first embodiment. The following points need to be clarified:
1. It is true that either the ‘insubstantial change’ or the ‘insubstantial difference’ of a second embodiment from a first embodiment can be determined only when there exists the first embodiment;
2. Nevertheless, it appears to be nearly true that the ‘insubstantial change’ of the second embodiment is made by a person because the person has in mind the image or imagination of the first embodiment while it seems to be almost correct that the ‘insubstantial difference’ of the second embodiment is inherently created from the most primitive concept of the ‘unity of invention’ and generally is easy to be understood that the ‘different’ second embodiment can be smartly conceived from the most primitive concept without the involvement of the first embodiment, although the first embodiment is finally invoked to determine that the second embodiment has an ‘insubstantial difference’ from the first embodiment.
3. “A determination of… equivalence does not involve the equitable tripartite test of the doctrine of equivalents.” This issue is one of the major topics in this article so that it should be dealt with in the part of Detailed Analyses.
4. The “sole question” under § 112, ? 6 requires a “comparison of the structure in the accused device which performs the claimed function to the structure in the [asserted patent’s] specification.” This passage in Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co. appears to have some kind of conflicts with the above-mentioned teaching in Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc. that “in ‘claim construction’ the words of the claims are construed independent of the accused product.” Accordingly, the following points can be reached:
1. If the former passage should outweigh the latter teaching, it means that the involvement of the accused device is unavoidable upon interpreting the claims. This appears to be more natural since if there is not an accused device and further if there is not a potential infringement, it seems unnecessary to call for determining whether a particular subject matter is an equivalent of an element in a patented claim;
2. If the latter teaching should predominate beyond the former passage, it would be hard to explain why the CAFC held a different opinion for ‘equivalents’ under § 112, ? 6 at a later time;
3. If the former passage and the latter teaching are equally correct and both applicable today, there come:
1. The claim construction or construing ‘equivalents’ under § 112, ? 6 shall be made independent of the accused product;
2. Accordingly, one should resort to the most primitive concept of the ‘unity of invention’ to logically figure out a specific embodiment which is different from the illustrated embodiment for the element in a patented claim in issue but is similar to the corresponding element in an accused product to the largest degree as possible as the case might be;
3. The word ‘comparison’ in this relevant passage in Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., i.e. “comparison of the structure in the accused device which performs the claimed function to the structure in the [asserted patent’s] specification,” is directed to the comparison between the hypothetically created element of the specific embodiment in the preceding paragraph and the corresponding element in the accused product. If we determine the hypothetically created element is equivalent to the corresponding element in the accused product through such comparison, we can in turn determine said corresponding element in the accused product is equivalent to the target element in the patented claim.
4. Through the preceding reasoning, it appears that the conflicts between different opinions in different periods by CAFC are solved. Nevertheless, we certainly do not know whether CAFC did or does so hold. Is so holding helpful? Is it right or helpful for us to try to explain away such conflicts?

Brief Items to be Discussed for Presenting Issues We Concern

*How should we do if the ruling court renders different opinions in different periods?

Detailed Analyses

*Whether the determination of equivalence under § 112, ? 6 requires the involvement of doctrine of equivalents?

Through the preceding discussions, it should raise no surprise to know what Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. ruled that ‘equivalents’ under § 112, ? 6 is a different concept from ‘equivalents’ under the judicially created doctrine equivalents. To better understand what this ruling is intended to convey, let us scrutinize the following passages seen in Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co.:

1. “While equivalency under the doctrine equivalents and equivalency under § 112, ? 6 both relate to insubstantial changes, each has a separate origin, purpose and application.” Regarding this passage, attentions are directed to the following points:
1. It should not be difficult to understand through the preceding explorations that Two Equivalents have separate origins, purposes and applications. It is interesting to note that the word ‘separate’ needs not be equivalent to the word ‘different.’ By this, we mean that their origins, purposes and applications do not necessarily be different in all aspects. Specifically,
1. Origin: The former comes from § 112, ? 6 while the latter originates from the doctrine of equivalents;
2. Purpose: The former is intended to delimit how far a specific element under § 112, ? 6 can reach while the latter is to determine whether an accused device can easily be tried to replace the subject matter in a patent claim by one skilled in the art;
3. Application: The former is much related to the diversities of an embodiment in a specification while the latter is generally related to a patent claim.
2. According to the CAFC, Two Equivalents both relate to ‘insubstantial changes.’ If this is true, we will fortunately have already had an answer to the title of this article. Is this really true? Let us consider:
1. Even though Two Equivalents have separate origins, purposes and applications, if they are both referred to ‘insubstantial changes,’ they should be equivalent since our final goal is to determine whether two things (or subject matters) are considered equivalent in determining either the former or the latter. This is because if they have the same judging standards or criteria, at least in some certain respect, why could it be possible that they are not equivalent?
2. It might be possible that Two Equivalents have the same judging standards, i.e. ‘insubstantial changes.’ Nevertheless, the same words in fact are referred to different meanings in different applications so that Two Equivalents are finally irrelevant or not equivalent. Before any quasi-conclusion can be made, we should more or less exercise further studies.
2. Under § 112, ? 6, one is to determine whether the element in the accused device which performs the corresponding claimed function “has the same or an equivalent structure as the structure described in the specification corresponding to the claim’s means.” This teaching paragraph appears to be in conflict with the above-mentioned teaching clause in Scripps Clinic & Research Found. V. Genentech, Inc. that “in ‘claim construction’ the words of the claims are construed independent of the accused product” since the former ruling strongly suggests that the accused device be involved in determining matters relating to the former. Nevertheless, let us examine this paragraph more carefully:
1. In clarifying the former, there must be two compared elements;
2. The two compared elements must perform the corresponding claimed function;
3. If the two compared elements are structural, one of them must come from the structure described in the specification corresponding to the claim’s means while it is uncertain from which the other one should come? Can it come from the accused device? It seems that Scripps Clinic & Research Found. V. Genentech, Inc. says no while Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co. says yes. Are we cute to compromise therebetween and assert that the other one should be referred to the hypothetically created one?
3. “Under the doctrine of equivalents…the question is whether the accused device is only insubstantially different than the claimed device.” It appears that our assertion that ‘insubstantial change’ should be replaced by ‘insubstantial difference’ can find some kind of basis from this passage. It should leave no room for doubt that the doctrine of equivalents will be invoked only when there are an accused device and a patented claim in order to determine whether the difference between the accused device and the claimed device is insubstantial. It should be clear whether there is an ’insubstantial difference’ should be determined by ‘one skilled in the art.’ Certainly, who is ‘one skilled in the art’ and how one skilled in the art determines there is an ‘insubstantial difference’ are not topics here.
4. The “tri-partite test” for the doctrine of equivalents is to determine whether elements of the accused device 1) perform substantially the same function 2) in substantially the same way 3) to achieve substantially the same result as limitations recited in the asserted patent claim. It should have been clear that the ‘tri-partite test’ is to finally test whether elements of the accused device are equivalent to limitations recited in the patented claim in respect of the following aspects:
1. Whether they perform substantially the same function? It might be easy to determine two functions are the same. Nevertheless, it might be not so easy to determine whether two functions are substantially the same, which might explain why lots of examiners hate the appearance of the word, “substantially,” in the claim. Certainly, it might be unfair that the judges can freely use this word while a claim drafter cannot.
2. Whether the function is performed by them in substantially the same way? It appears among these three aspects, this test is the core part, which is relatively difficult to be solved. It normally involves in judgments which might be controversial somehow, even from the viewpoint of one skilled in the art.
3. Whether they achieve substantially the same result. This test is as easy as, or even more easier than the same function test since the function test might involve in whether the function concerned is primary or secondary.
5. Does ‘insubstantial changes’ really refer to different meanings when respectively applied to the former and the latter? It appears we have made them clear that:
1. The court said that the former and the latter both relate to “insubstantial changes” but also said that their concept or interpretation should be different. If the court is really correct, we now have the straightforward answer that they do have different meanings when respectively applied to the former and the latter. Nevertheless, it might be possible that the court desires to differently mean but inadvertently uses the improper words, i.e. ‘insubstantial changes,’ or that the court believes that it is natural or convincing to the public that ‘insubstantial changes’ will mean differently in respective situations of the former and the latter. If this is not the case, the court should have cast a dilemma for all kinds of patent practitioners since it is relatively easy for one to literally understand that while the word ‘equivalents’ in the former and the latter both relate to ‘insubstantial changes’, they do have different origins, purposes and applications on the one hand, it appears to be uneasy for one to figure out how to set out the rules for concretely implementing such understanding in practice on the other hand.
2. Semantically, the words ‘insubstantial difference’ might rescue the above-mentioned paradox caused through the use of the words ‘insubstantial changes.’ Such rescue might solve the issue that the former involves in nothing with the accused device, however, it does not disengage us from suffering from the hardship how to embody that they have different origins, purposes and applications? We do try to literally, and more importantly successfully, explain in the above what is meant by different origins, purposes and applications. Nevertheless, a successful literal explanation does not necessarily mean we have already had the expediency and/or ability to rein the matter we are puzzling.
6. Whether the determination of equivalence under § 112, ? 6 requires the involvement of doctrine of equivalents? We must admit that it might be too fast from the above reasoning to reach a stage suitable for solving or answering this question. Again, we leave this task to the patent US attorneys. We also confess that such a question is a direct conflict or impact against the court rulings. Nevertheless, we cannot but feel like to give a ‘yes’ answer to this question in that:
1. The court rulings have made it clear that they both relate to ‘insubstantial changes’;
2. Although their origins, purposes or applications might be really different, this does not harm to their intermingling in that:
1. Although their final purposes might be really different, this does not naturally mean that they cannot be judged by the same intermediate standards so as to reach the really desired result of ‘insubstantial changes’;
2. Although their destined applications might be really different, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that they cannot be judged by the same intermediate standards so as to reach the really desired result of ‘insubstantial changes.’
3. If their judging standards for reaching the final result of ‘insubstantial changes’ are the same, why we cannot conclude that the determination of equivalence under § 112, ? 6 requires the involvement of doctrine of equivalents?

*Whether there are significant differences between that the second embodiment comes from the most primitive concept of ‘unity of invention’ and that the second embodiment is changed from or obtained in view of the first embodiment?

This topic is created to try to explain away from a certain aspect that the court rulings are not in conflict with each other. That is, the determination of equivalence under § 112, ? 6 requires no involvement of the accused device. Before we make any comments, it might be interested and interesting to note the following passages made by the US judges:

1. The court discloses in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. U.S. that “[E]quivalency is established where a person reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not disclosed in the patent with one that was.” In this passage, we could find:
1. Equivalency is to be established between two ingredients;
2. One of the ingredients is disclosed in the patent while the other one ingredient is not;
3. A person reasonably skilled in the art would have known that the two ingredients are interchangeable. It would seem that the words ‘would have known’ have been chosen by the judges for the time factor to denote that such interchangeability is recognizable by one skilled in the art at the time the invention is made or the application is filed;
4. It appears, nevertheless, that this court might present the idea that said one ingredient is irrelevant to an accused product and is one hypothetically created as described before.
2. According to Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., the finding or question of known interchangeability is not dispositive or answered by determining whether both the disclosed and accused structures serve the same function, but by focusing on whether it was known that the accused structure was an equivalent of that disclosed in the specification as corresponding to the means. We could find from this court teaching as follows:
1. This court appeared to consider that finding the known interchangeability is not dispositive in finding the equivalency under § 112, ? 6;
2. It should not be strange for us to hear from the above that the interchangeability is not proved simply because two structures serve the same function. It does sound strange to know that one of the structures is the accused structure in finding the interchangeability since the interpretation of § 112, ? 6 should not involve in the accused device. Is it possible for us to believe that this court as a matter of fact is saying that:
1. There is a first interchangeability between the disclosed structure and the hypothetically created structure; and
2. There is a second interchangeability between the hypothetically created structure and the accused structure.
3. This court further teaches us that the interchangeability can be found if we find the accused (or hypothetically, more exactly?) structure is an equivalent of the disclosed structure. It is believed that the court in fact teaches us nothing but presents trouble of finding how to define or prove the interchangeability since it appears for this court to believe first that equivalency can be found through the interchangeability but then teaches the interchangeability can be proved by equivalency.
3. According to Intel Corp. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, we have the following teachings:
1. Under § 112, ? 6, the specification, prosecution history, other claims in the patent and expert testimony but not the prior art are to be used as aids for determining what structure is equivalent to that disclosed in the patent specification. Through this teaching, we learn:
1. If we are clever enough to determine whether an accused structure is equivalent to a hypothetically created one, in order to stick to the view that the interpretation of § 112, ? 6 should not involve in the accused device, we can freely exercise our strenuous efforts in possibly locating a hypothetically created structure which not only is equivalent to the disclosed one but also is equivalent to the accused one to prove there is an equivalency between the accused and the disclosed ones through the consultations with the specification, prosecution history, other claims and expert testimony; and
2. Although the prior art is not to serve a helpful source used as aids for determining the equivalency, the prior art is not precluded to support that a particular structure designed based on the prior art is equivalent to what is disclosed in the specification.
2. Unlike the doctrine of equivalents which is limited by the content of the prior art, even if the prior art discloses the structure disclosed in the patent specification corresponding to the recited means or an equivalent structure, the means-plus-function limitation will not be limited in scope thereby. Accordingly, we have the following:
1. It is quite clear that any one cannot claim anything belonging to the prior art or the public domain. As a result, it is natural that the application of doctrine of equivalents cannot extend the claim protecting scope to cover what is in the prior art;
2. Since what § 112, ? 6 desires to clarify is what structure is equivalent to that disclosed in the specification, any one can utilize what he or she know or the prior art to present an equivalent structure which is to be included in the originally intended equivalent coverage of the disclosed structure so that any patentee can make use of the prior art to substantiate its assertion that a particular structure is equivalent to the disclosed one;
3. We thus can draw a clearly discernible line between § 112, ? 6 and doctrine of equivalents that the prior art can be used to expand the coverage of § 112, ? 6 but must be used to limit the scope of doctrine of equivalents. How is this possible? It is believed that the answer is readily clear that the feature of a claim where the interpretation of § 112, ? 6 is necessary does not primarily reside in the means-plus-function limitation but in its relationship with other elements in the claim while the potential feature of a claim where the doctrine of equivalents is to be applied is normally directed to the particular structure (or relationship) where the doctrine of equivalents is to be discussed.

Even if the above paragraph clearly tells apart the differences between § 112, ? 6 and the doctrine of equivalents, we still have not expedient measures to decide whether Two Equivalents are equivalent. Nevertheless, we would like to fast conclude this topic by the following paragraphs:

1. If it is believed that § 112, ? 6 and the doctrine of equivalents are both related to ‘insubstantial changes,’ it is believed that we can freely judge whether a second structure (or embodiment) is changed from or obtained in view of the first embodiment disclosed in the specification either for the former or the latter. The second structure certainly can include the one in the accused device;
2. Even if we try to designedly explain away the conflicts between court rulings on § 112, ? 6 and the doctrine of equivalents so as to take that the ‘insubstantial changes’ test should be replaced by the ‘insubstantial differences’ test so that it is important for us to determine whether the second embodiment comes from the most primitive concept of ‘unity of invention’ rather than that of the first embodiment, the expedient criterion still do not exist for determining whether there are ‘insubstantial changes’ or whether Two Equivalents are equivalent?
3. Although the ‘tri-partite’ test is created for judging the latter, its criterion can be used for the references of determining the former.
4. Although the interpretation of the former requires no involvement in of the accused device in theory, it does not mean that the accused device cannot be involved in deciding the equivalency under 112, ? 6.

*How should we do if the ruling court renders different opinions in different periods?

As is known, the law is always behind the technology. If the world is advancing, a latter court opinion should be superior to a former one in theory. Nevertheless, intermingled gist and potential issues hidden in a case ruling need not necessarily follow the supposition that a latter court ruling is more correct than a former one. How to extract useful teachings from case rulings and how to exercise subtle sensation to deal with more and more challenging and complex issues are problems in front of the human being living in this world made more and more complicated by all of us.

1. Ascertaining whether Two Equivalents are equivalent might help us understand or find out the finally correct interpretation of the functional claim language.
2. A new ruling or precedent might solve a problem but might equally be possible to present a new problem. If this is the case, it might deserve to cost us strenuous considerations between abolishment and limitation of applicable range of the new ruling or precedent.
3. If § 112, ? 6 really invokes any concept, it should be that of ‘insubstantial difference’ rather than ‘insubstantial change’ in order to better conform to what the US courts continuously take. Certainly, it is understood that the introduction of ‘insubstantial difference’ does not solve all matters brought forth by Two Equivalents.
4. Although trying to explain away the conflicts or contradictions between different rulings rendered by the courts is interesting, might such trial delay the emergence of a possible more important clarifying ruling from the court?
5. Although Two Equivalents might have different origins, purposes and applications, it is unnecessarily wrong that the determination of equivalence under § 112, ? 6 calls for the same judging standards with doctrine of equivalents?
6. A clearly discernible line may be drawn between § 112, ? 6 and doctrine of equivalents that the prior art can be used to expand the coverage of § 112, ? 6 but must be used to limit the scope of doctrine of equivalents.
7. The feature of a claim where the interpretation of § 112, ? 6 is necessary does not primarily reside in the means-plus-function limitation but in its relationship with other elements in the claim while the potential feature of a claim where the doctrine of equivalents is to be applied is normally directed to the particular structure (or relationship) in the claim where the doctrine of equivalents is to be discussed.
8. Although the ‘tri-partite’ test is created for judging the doctrine of equivalents, its criterion can be used for the references of determining the equivalency under 112, ? 6.
9. Although the interpretation of the 112, ? 6 requires no involvement in of the accused device in theory, it does not mean that the accused device cannot be involved in deciding the equivalency under 112, ? 6.

Intermingled gist and potential issues hidden in a case ruling need not necessarily follow the supposition that a latter court ruling is more correct than a former one. How to extract useful teachings from case rulings and how to exercise subtle sensation to deal with more and more challenging and complex issues are problems in front of the human being living in this world made more and more complicated by all of us.