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Article 72 (3) of ROC Patent Law©
Autumn, 19999 

Present Situation:

       Asia Chemical Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ACC) and Four Pillars Enterprises Company, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as FPE) are now involving in a patent dispute with Globe Industries Corporation (hereinafter referred to as GIC) for ROC Patent Application No. 54625 (hereinafter referred to as Patent) entitled ¡§Non-Knifing Plastic Adhesive Tape¡¨, filed on January 21, 1971, allowed and published on December 1, 1971 and expired on January 21, 1981.

Historical Background:

       It is believed to be safe to consider that this application is the most famous case hardly unknown to any national here who even only habitually reads headlines of economic news.  Its administrative dispute ran from 1971 to 1990 and its decided judicial litigation involving in about NT$400,000,000 began from 1972 and still continues now.

       Original Primary Disclosure in January 21, 1971 Specification not more than two pages in totality is directed to an invention claiming a method for manufacturing an adhesive plastic tape without any drawing.  As contemplated, such adhesive plastic tape can be easily torn simply by the user¡¥s finger to provide a non-deformed torn tape with a flush or straight torn end in order to reduce the work cost and be labor-effective.  The single claim reads ¡§a method of embossing kinds of specially designed patterns on a surface of an adhesive plastic tape in order to reduce the contact area between an adhesive and a plastic surface of said adhesive plastic tape.¡¨  This application and the claim were subject to six times in more than 3 years amendments including being converted into one for a utility model, revising the specification, incorporating into the specification a drawing and changing and/or adding claims even having been allowed for about three years.  The final version of the claim being single again is as follows: ¡§a packaging adhesive plastic tape having a plastic tape layer and an adhesive layer in which the plastic tape layer has a flat surface applying thereon said adhesive layer and an opposite surface fully breadthwise embossed with parallel straight or dotted lines or a pattern in a manner that a protruded portion is thicker and has a stronger anti-tearing strength and a recessed portion is thinner and has a weaker anti-bearing strength such that in use, by the user¡¥s finger, said adhesive plastic tape is tearable to provide a flush torn end along a recessed weakened portion without a knife.¡¨

       It is to be noticed from what the above has shown that the applicant proceeded a conversion action similar to a refiling procedure, that according to the then-applicable Patent Law, subject matters before and after conversion should not be different and a conversion action shall be exercised when the applicant regards its application involves in a different creation level and desires to secure the original filing date of the parent application, that this country did and does not have a CIP (Continuation-In-Part) application system as in the US, and that this case was and still is considered to have an effective filing date of January 21, 1971.

       After decided by the Supreme Court awarding unprecedented huge damages to GIC in late 1996, ACC contacted this firm and questioned ¡§do you believe there is any relief measure by which we can find our justice since Patent does really not qualify as a creation?¡¨  In response thereto, this firm uttered ¡§if Patent does not qualify as a creation, we foresee a 99% success rate to lift the liability of bearing the huge damages.¡¨  The history of the new struggle on Patent thus ran from that time.

       At first, by conducting inter alia a global validity search, we carefully looked into whether Patent is valid?  After a quite thorough evaluation, it appears to us Patent is invalid and we accordingly advised the client ¡§we have a near 100% confidence that the Patent will be invalidated.¡¨  In deploying armors we had at hand and drawing up the attacking strategies, we initiated 4 invalidating proceedings in late 1996 and early 1997 against Patent, including a first one directed to kinds of formality defects Patent had assumed and the rest three ones respectively directed to violations of novelty, non-obviousness and novelty and/or non-obviousness and respectively backed up by three groups of unified brand new and/or old evidences.  As contemplated, since each invalidation proceedings could independently crash Patent, Patent could in no way survive over this wave of attacks, which would in turn make obsolete the decision of the Supreme Court awarding damages through a retrial proceedings.

       It is to be noticed that Patent had been subjected to and survived over various opposition proceedings and two invalidation proceedings (hereinafter referred to as Former Proceedings) nearly 30 years ago.  The evidences used in the four invalidation proceedings, nevertheless, are either de facto totally different from those of Former Proceedings or de jure different therefrom.   This is because even if evidences A and B have been used in a former proceedings, evidences A, B and C can still be legally used in a latter proceedings in that how evidences A and/or B cooperates with C to present the evidence should be different from that presented by evidences A and B in the former proceedings.  The situation remains the same even if the latter proceedings also uses only evidences A and B but presents them in a legally different way.  This is why Article 72(2) of ROC Patent Law stipulates that ¡§examined opposition or invalidation proceedings in the preceding paragraph having been irrevocably dismissed, no one shall initiate further invalidation proceedings by same fact and same evidence.¡¨  Specifically, this article shall apply only when not only the same evidence(s) are used but the same fact(s) are involved in.  As an example, when evidences A and B are cooperated with each other in a first aspect in the former proceedings to present the attacking arguments, one can legally use same evidences unified in a latter proceedings in a second aspect legally different from the first aspect, since although evidences are the same, facts are different.  The problem thus resides in that how to determine that the second aspect is legally different from the first aspect?   It is believed that no one can give a simple and accurate answer to this problem.  

       Just like what is happened to the patentable requirement of non-obviousness, facing such indefinite legal concept, the human being feels exhausting, exhausted, challenging, stinging, hopeless, desperate and wretched, and begins to know humble, limited and polite.   There has been an outstanding well-armed legal scholar in this country provocatively raises that there is no indefinite legal concept in the world since it is readily clear what is meant by that indefinite legal concept.  What is really indefinite is how to decide whether there is a case, which should be governed by the indefinite legal concept.  This should be attributed to shortage of hardworking attempts, limitation of abilities and/or poverty in researches and developments but is irrelevant to the fact that there is an indefinite legal concept on earth.  It is thus believed that if the underlying reasons and/or arguments respectively in first and second aspects should be considered different in view of one¡¦s legal feelings, the first aspect is legally different from the second aspect.  The question ¡§what is meant by ¡¥different in view of one¡¦s legal feelings¡¦¡¨ comes again.  It would be controversial whether such explanation as an attempt to interpret the doubt merely complicates the matter?  This is because this explanation introduces therein two variables or ¡¥indefinite¡¦ terms to be defined.

       Interestingly, in Former Proceedings, a great many of local lawyers or firms of great or certain fame were involved therein, trying to rescue the situation, but failed.  Remorsefully by FPE and regretfully to some extent by ACC presently, FPE did consider to but finally not join in this wave of attacks and initiated by itself an independent invalidation proceedings in late 1996 before it received a final decision from the Supreme Court.  This was because FPE was wondering whether this firm, being so young (then about 4 years old) could assume this heavy and hardly possible mission.  It is to be noticed that Article 72(3) of ROC Patent Law, which stipulates that ¡§an interested party having a recoverable legal interest with cancellation of a patent right may initiate invalidation proceedings after expiration or natural extinction of the patent right,¡¨ was enacted into law in March 1994 according to Great Judge Conference Explanation No. 213, which was striven to be rendered by the Great Judge Conference by several companies including FPE and ACC and headed by FPE in Former Proceedings.  It was said that the independent invalidation proceedings plainly uses all evidences in Former Proceedings without being differently unified or grouped together from a different legal aspect.  If this were the case, the independent invalidation proceedings will have an uphill battle before the clause of ¡¥same fact and same evidence¡¦ in above-mentioned Article 72(2) of the Patent Law.

       Just before and after the lunar new year¡¦s week holidays, NBS (National Bureau of Standards) (former agency of IPO, Intellectual Property Office) in very early 1998 issued notifications respectively rejecting to entertain the 5 newly initiated invalidation proceedings by alleging that ACC and FPE failed to satisfy the requirement of ¡¥having a recoverable legal interest with cancellation¡¦ of Patent as set forth in Article 72(3) of the Patent Law in that the relevant judicial criminal offence and civil infringement decisions ACC and FPE had received had been irrevocably decided by the Supreme Court so that there will be no way for ACC and/or FPE to anticipate any ¡¥recoverable legal interest.¡¦  Overwhelmingly shocked by this creative legal theorem, ACC and FPE followed the normal procedures to appeal the case to the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA).  After MOEA dismissing the 4 invalidating proceedings initiated by ACC, the Executive Yuan dismissing the re-appeal proceedings again with substantially the same reasons alleged by NBS or IPO and some added similar reasons both to be carefully discussed hereinafter.  Presently, these 4 cases are pending before the Administrative Court being now flooded with thousands of appeal cases respectively originating from thousands of former member staffs of Chung San Science Research Institute of Ministry of National Defense, protesting the compulsory retirement/dismissal program.   Being defeated in IPO, MOEA and Executive Yuan, not only this firm is somewhat desperate, but it seems ACC loses some confidence on this firm.  In order to cope with this situation, ACC has caused many other experts including retired great judge from the Great Judge Conference, retired judges from General Court and Administrative Court and highly recommended senior attorneys-at-law to take their parts in the Administrative Court proceedings.

       Nevertheless, MOEA remanded the independent invalidation proceedings initiated by FPE to be reviewed by NBS and ruled in its decision that the notification rendered by NBS is questionable in view of the fact that the independent invalidation proceedings was initiated in November 1996 which is earlier than August 1997 when FPE received the decision decided by the Supreme Court on the civil infringement.  In March, 1999, IPO issued an Office Action rejecting the independent invalidation proceedings again on the basis that although the previous notification might be defective by failing to recognize that the independent invalidation proceedings was initiated before the Supreme Court rendered its decision, the result/situation would not have been changed since effective from the date on which FPE received the Supreme Court decision in August, 1997 irrevocably confirming the infringement liabilities FPE should assume, FPE still had no stand thereafter to satisfy the requirement of ¡¥having a recoverable legal interest with cancellation¡¦ of Patent as stipulated in Article 72(3) of the Patent Law.  After appealing the case to MOEA by FPE, MOEA in July, 1999 made a decision reversing the Action IPO had made on the bases that upon initiating the independent invalidation proceedings, FPE¡¦s civil litigation was still pending before the Supreme Court so that FPE does exist a relief interest for rectifying the original action through invalidation, which should not be adversely affected ¡¥because there proceeded the civil litigation¡¦ (which cannot be precisely understood), and that even civil or criminal judgements have become irrevocable during the invalidation proceedings, a retrial proceedings can, but not might, be legally instituted according to Article 496(1)(11) of Code of Civil Proceedings which stipulates that ¡¥civil or criminal or other decisions or administrative action on which a judgement is based has been changed by a later irrevocable judgement or administrative action¡¦ if the independent invalidation proceedings is tenable, which is irrelevant to the fact IPO has asserted that the Supreme Court being the third instance is a legal instance in which any party cannot submit any new fact and new evidence.  As a result, the action IPO has rendered is improper and an appropriate action anew rendered is called for.

       It can be known that if the 4 invalidating proceedings initiated by ACC were jointly submitted by FPE, both ACC and FPE should now in a better position since so far as ACC is concerned, the 4 invalidating proceedings were initiated thereby after civil and/or criminal litigations had been irrevocably decided whereas so far as FPE is concerned, they were initiated before it received the Supreme Court decision irrevocably deciding the relevant civil infringement.  Although we still are worryingly confident in succeeding the 4 invalidating proceedings in such extremely worse situation, it might deserve to spend a little while to analyze why FPE did not finally jointly submit the 4 invalidating proceedings as originally contemplated.   It appears to us there were the following reasons:

    1)    FPE, advised by the attorney-at-law engaging in the successful explanation petition of the above-mentioned Great Judge Conference that any attempt to relieve the situation it suffers or will suffer is a mission impossible, strongly wondered how an invalidating proceedings should be initiated?

    2)    FPE desired to extremely deliberately construct the contents of briefs of the invalidating proceedings through repetitive discussions in meetings summoning together past experienced participants relating to Patent.  As a result, it presented a big problem how to compromise among opinions originating from sound experts coming from various fields;

    3)    Cherishing the spectacular past records it made or headed to make, including bringing forward Great Judge Conference Explanation No. 213 and Article 72 (3) of Patent Law, it appeared that FPE did not well adapt itself to be co-named in the 4 invalidating proceedings headed by ACC;

    4)    Attributing to the above and other reasons, the outcome was FPE submitted the independent invalidating proceedings at a later date and attempted to submit another invalidating proceedings detailedly discussing and deducing how and why each official authority relating to Patent had erred in rendering its respective action.  Such another invalidating proceedings, however, never comes to this world.

       As advised by Confucius that one can impute his failure to destiny if he has done all possible, it appears to us that no one is blamable and nothing is regretful.

Analyses and Discussions:

       Knowing the above-mentioned interesting background, we would like to carefully discuss now the propriety of opinions shown in action and/or decision of administrative authorities including IPO, MOEA and Executive Yuan on Article 72(3) of ROC Patent Law hereinafter. 

       While listing respectively all reasons alleged by administrative authorities to dismiss the 4 invalidating proceedings (hereinafter referred to as Proceedings) at the present stage, we would like to correspondingly propose immediately thereafter what we argue and think as follows:

    1)  Upon initiating Proceedings, the civil and criminal decisions had been respectively irrevocably rendered by the Supreme Court and Taiwan High Court and the criminal decision had been executed so that all legal interests ACC has have been irrevocably decided and no more recoverable.   Accordingly, Proceedings cannot meet with the requirements of Article 72(3) of the Patent Law and shall not be entertained;

Our arguments directed thereagainst are briefly quoted in the following:

A.   The outcome of a single civil or criminal litigation does not necessarily present the historical reality of an event but involves in whether proofs have been duly deposed, whether attack and/or defense have been skillfully exercised and/or whether the litigation proceedings have been properly proceeded.  The event can be repetitively argued through different subject matters of court action (a term in the continental law, which corresponds to causes of action in the oceanic law).  Specifically, if a party loses in a civil or criminal litigation directed to the attack on and/or defense of a specific subject matter of court action (or cause of action), the party can legally initiate another civil or criminal litigation directed to the attack on and/or defense of another specific subject matter of court action (or cause of action);

B.   It is true that after a particular civil or criminal litigation has been decided by the Supreme Court, there ensues the irrevocability on that particular civil or criminal litigation.  Accordingly, although there might be an irreversibility of the court decision on that particular civil or criminal litigation, it never represents there already is an irretraceability on the historical reality of the event;

C.   Thus, even there exists an irrevocable decision for a particular civil or criminal litigation on a specific subject matter arguing the event, any one or any entity have no stand to conclude thereby that any body has been no legal interest with the event.

    2)  If Proceedings should be entertained as asserted by ACC incapable of proving there exists a recoverable legal interest, so far as all patent rights after their expirations or natural extinctions are concerned, the legal effect formed before their expiration or extinction will never become stable.  Accordingly, it is apparent that ACC claiming to have a recoverable legal interest through suffering from the irrevocable disadvantageous civil or criminal decision has confused the premise with the consequence or the cause with the result;

Our arguments directed thereagainst are briefly quoted in the following:

A.  ACC never doubts but respects the irrevocability of decisions (hereinafter referred to as Decisions) on original civil or criminal litigations.  Nevertheless, it is equally possible or true for ACC to institute another civil or criminal litigations through another subject matter of court action to obtain irrevocable favorable decisions thereon.  Legal effects of decisions on original or another civil or criminal litigations can simultaneously coexist and be respectively irrevocable where the latter ones might cause the former ones to be unenforceable;

B.   The fact that Patent has ever existed is the basis or the premise of Decisions and is petitioned to be investigated by Proceedings.   In contrast, Decisions are the consequence of the fact that Patent has ever existed since the court here only deals with whether or not there is an infringement but is always blind as to whether the patent in concern is valid.  So far as Patent and Decisions are concerned, it should be clear which one is the premise or cause and which one is the consequence or result.  It should also be clear it is ACC or the administrative authority who or which has confused the premise or cause with the consequence or result.

    3)  There already exists irrevocability on Decisions.  ACC has no position to claim it has a recoverable legal interest on invalidating Patent simply because it may still institute a retrial proceedings on Decisions, in order that the irrevocability of decision will not become nonsense;

Our arguments directed thereagainst are briefly quoted in the following:

A.   It should be easily discernible to differentiate the recoverable legal interest of a specific subject matter of court action from the recoverable legal interest of the event since as mentioned hereinbefore, the same legal event can be lawfully respectively disputed from different subject matters of court action simultaneously or at different times;

B.   It is equally correct to believe that Decisions already are irrevocable and that it still exists with ACC a recoverable legal interest with respect to the event since without that event, ACC need not be decided to be liable for damages awarded by the court so that ACC must exist a recoverable legal interest on the event since according to technique presently available, it is still impossible for the human being to root an event out of the history.

    4)  According to ACC, if Proceedings are entertained, it is ¡¥possible¡¦ that Patent will be invalidated by which it is again ¡¥possible¡¦ to institute the retrial proceedings for Decisions by which it is in turn ¡¥possible¡¦ to exclude the legal effect caused by the irrevocable Decisions¡K.   Thus, what ACC has sought after merely relates to a series of ¡¥possible¡¦;

Our arguments directed thereagainst are briefly quoted in the following:

A.  Each of all ¡¥possible¡¦ incidents referred to in the above relates to a legal interest since it has been repetitively made clear by precedents whether there exists a legal interest shall be formally judged;

B.   To determine whether Proceedings shall be entertained only requires the existence of the first ¡¥possible.¡¦  Even though administrative authorities have unfoundedly superimposed on Proceedings kinds of ¡¥possible,¡¦ the fact that there exists for ACC a legal interest can in no way be scrubbed off;

C.  It would seem that the administrative authority purposively intend to wreck this case in that it is readily apparent that if the first ¡¥possible¡¦ is affirmed, it is necessitated that all the remaining ¡¥possible¡¦ become definite so that there only is a ¡¥possible¡¦ with no else.

    5)  The sentence that ¡¥there exists a recoverable legal interest through cancellation of [said] action¡¦ as mentioned in Great Judge Conference Explanation No. 213 shall not be construed to include the situation that there exists a ¡¥possibility¡¦ of instituting a retrial proceedings after the civil and criminal patent infringement litigations have been irrevocably decided;

Our arguments directed thereagainst are briefly quoted in the following:

A.  Great Judge Conference Explanation No. 213 never expresses its inapplicability to the situation that there exists a ¡¥possibility¡¦ of instituting a retrial proceedings after the civil and criminal patent infringement litigations have been irrevocably decided.  Even if we retreat to believe that the ¡¥recoverable legal interest¡¦ does not include the ¡¥possibility¡¦ of instituting a retrial proceedings, we cannot agree that the recoverable legal interest does not include the right for ACC to argue against the event from a different subject matter of court action;

B.   On the contrary, according to ¡¥statutorily reserved principle¡¦ which means whenever the ruling power desires to deprive some kind of right from a person, the government must have a statutory basis, without citing any kind of statutory basis, it is arbitrarily unfounded for the administrative authority to murmur or to cry to that effect;

C.  Specifically, if Patent is invalidated, we can rest assured that ACC will succeed in the retrial proceedings by which we can rest assured again that all liabilities presently put on ACC can all be legally removed.

    6)  So far as the present legal status is concerned, the relevant civil and criminal litigations have been irrevocably decided and the administrative action on which judicial judgements are based has not been changed so that ACC cannot presently find reason for a retrial proceedings.  Since ACC cannot locate an existent retrial reason, it is extremely doubtful that ACC owns a legal recoverable interest.

Our arguments directed thereagainst are briefly quoted in the following:

A.  The word ¡¥recoverable¡¦ in the relevant clause of Article 72(3) of the Patent Law is an adjective and exactly means ¡¥it is possible to recover.¡¦  Accordingly, Article 72(3) of the Patent Law only requires there is a possibility to recover ones¡¦ legal interest other than a guarantee that one can recover his legal interest.  This is because the human being is so weak, fragile and tiny and must suffer during his life from kinds of faults and misfortunes.  It is thus impossible for any one on earth to guarantee in the future any specific happening which is to be decided by others and will occur only in the future;

B.   Proceedings are initiated to seek changed the result of the administrative action allowing Patent so that it would be rootedly ridiculous for the administrative authority to reject entertainment of Proceedings by alleging that the administrative action on which judicial judgements are based has not been changed, since if the administrative action has been changed, how it will become possible to have Proceedings initiated?

C.  Specifically, whether ACC has a recoverable legal interest on Proceedings shall be judged on whether ACC will gain a legal interest if ACC succeeds in Proceedings that has been repetitively clearly shown by precedents ruling ¡¥whether it is favorable [to the appellant] shall be formally judged at the time the action was taken.  Specifically, it is favorable [to the appellant] if the action appears to be favorable at the time it was taken.  An action is not to be determined after the court has rendered its decision to be favorable or unfavorable.¡¦

7) According to the retrial provisions in Code of Civil Proceedings, a party having claimed or known without claiming the retrial reason or cause before the relevant litigation has been irrevocably decided is ineligible to institute a retrial proceedings.  In Former Proceedings having been irrevocably decided by the Administrative Court, ACC had argued Patent cannot meet with requirements of patentabilities.  If Patent has other violations in law, ACC should so argue before Former Proceedings were irrevocably decided.   ACC shall not cook up the pretext that there is a possibility of instituting the retrial proceedings for trying to meet with the requirement of ¡¥recoverable legal interest¡¦ after the relevant litigation has been unfavorably decided, and trying to gloss over the unfavorable litigation result through its failure in proper attack and/or defense by initiation of Proceedings;Our arguments directed thereagainst are briefly quoted in the following:

A.  According to Code of Civil Proceedings, even a party knew a retrial reason that Patent is invalid before the relevant litigation has been irrevocably decided, it still is eligible to institute the retrial proceedings if it could not then submit what he knew as a legal retrial reason.  Specifically, although it strongly believes Patent is invalid, it could not submit its belief as a legal retrial reason.  It is only until the time when it can show to the court¡¦s belief that Patent is invalid, can it use its belief before the court for the retrial proceedings;

B.   It is true that in Former Proceedings, ACC has argued Patent is invalid, which, however, is irrelevant to the lawfulness of Proceedings in that evidences and/or facts used in Proceedings and Former Proceedings are different.  Accordingly, Proceedings can freely pass the scrutiny of Article 72(2) of the Patent Law.  When Proceedings can meet with the requirements of Article 72(2) of the Patent Law, it is naturally baseless for the administrative authority to utter any more what kind of fact has been argued in the past; 

C.  Most importantly, according to the Patent Law, evidences and/or facts which are not submitted upon the initiation of an opposition or invalidation proceedings or within one month from the date of such initiation shall not be considered or evaluated in the proceedings.  If the administrative authority obeys the law by which the administrative authority is assumed to abide without failure, how the administrative authority can divert ACC from following the law and, nevertheless, require ACC argue other violations in law by Patent in Former Proceedings before irrevocably decided since it is illegal for ACC to argue violations of law by Patent other than those extractable from evidences and facts initially submitted;

D.  Even ACC intentionally delays the initiation of Proceedings until the patent infringement litigation was irrevocably decided, it is irrelevant to cook up a pretext for establishing a possibility of instituting a retrial proceedings for meeting with requirements of recoverable legal interest.  This is because litigation and administrative relief rights conferred by the Constitution impart freedom to ACC to decide when and/or whether Proceedings and/or retrial proceedings should be invoked.  It is terribly fine for ACC to decide the institution of Proceedings only after ACC found the Supreme Court, contrary to its anticipation or assertion, unexpectedly ruled against its favor;

E.   The time when Proceedings should be initiated is totally free up to ACC.  Thus, the fact that Proceedings were not initiated until the patent infringement litigation had been irrevocably decided has nothing to do with glossing over the unfavorable litigation result.  Even if ACC desired to obviate the necessity of being liable for damages awarded by the court through its improper and insufficient attack and/or defense in the patent infringement litigation by initiation of Proceedings, it is beyond any kind of illegality.

    8)  If no deadline or time is set for the initiation of an invalidation proceedings after expiration or extinction of the patent right, a party receiving an unfavorable decision on the civil and/or criminal litigations can still institute ¡¥at any time¡¦ the invalidation proceedings after expiration or extinction of the patent right, which will not only result in a serious harm so far as the maintenance of the legal order is concerned, but is easily exploited by the one who is suffering from an unfavorable decision to present a tool for interfering with or obstructing the effects an irrevocable decision should have;

Our arguments directed thereagainst are briefly quoted in the following:

A.      As will become apparent from the above-mentioned ¡¥statutory reserved principle,¡¦ any limitation on rights of the national must be statutorily provided.  Since there is no statutory deadline or time for initiation of the invalidation proceedings, any interested party including the one having received an unfavorable decision on the civil and/or criminal litigations can certainly ¡¥at any time¡¦ institute the invalidation proceedings after expiration or extinction of the patent right;

B.      Any action taken according to the justice or law will not in any way harm the legal order.  On the contrary, it is such unlimited statutory appeal system which effectively drains off kinds of social discontents including anger, complaint, disdain, grievance, grudge, grumble, hate, indignation, ire, rage, resentment, wrath against the society and/or the government.   Should there exist no such statutory appeal system, the society and/or the government will get collapsed or crumbled relatively easily;

C.      Even the saint will sometime do wrong, not to mention the judge in the court.  If an irrevocable decision involves in an unjust factor, the party who receive the unfavorable decision surely has rights to argue against that decision according to the statutory provisions regardless of whether it is irrevocable;

    9)  ACC has litigated with GIC for more than 20 years and should have exhausted possibilities and its abilities to nullify Patent.  Accordingly, even ACC¡¦s assertions are viable, what the fact shows is contrary to ACC¡¦s declaration that ACC found reasons and evidences capable of invalidating Patent after expiration of Patent.

Our arguments directed thereagainst are briefly quoted in the following:

A.   The saying ¡¥truth is uneasy to find¡¦ is best interpreted by the present case.  It appears that the present case only involves in an easy legal problem, as outlined above, having called for so much struggling but has not been comfortably accepted by the administrative authority.  How can the administrative authority determine ACC had exhausted possibilities and its abilities for nullifying Patent simply because ACC had disputed with GIC for more than 20 years?

B.   It would appear that the administrative authority has somewhat moved its position to concede to state that ACC¡¦s assertions might be viable.  It is, however, never realizable why it is impossible for ACC to be able to find reasons and evidences capable of invalidating Patent after its expiration?   As a simple exemplary reason, it was not possible until 1996, can ACC locate a competent firm, such as Deep & Far being then only of 4 years old, of enough mettle to strive against the present case.  It is equally hardly understandable by what kinds of reasons and evidences, the administrative authority takes the fact as contrary to ACC¡¦s faithful and honest declaration;

C.   Since its stipulation, Article 72(3) of the Patent Law finds no application.  If it still cannot be applied to Patent, it would appear that this article merely serves a function of decoration.

Conclusion:

       Although it is extremely hard to tell how the present will evolve since it is now still pending before the Administrative Court, it is hardly possible for this firm to allow the present case to be lost even after all other elected participants have given up to struggle with the case since it is our indisputable belief that the 4 invalidating proceedings can certainly pass the scrutiny of Article 72(3) of ROC Patent Law.  Although it appears that nothing is impossible under the sun, we will endeavor after the justice before the Patent Law to look after the interested party as the law is originally enacted to be.

       We can accept we are defeated because what we have presented in briefs in Proceedings is unfounded or unconvincing after substantive examinations on Proceedings.  Nevertheless, it is impossible for us to take that Proceedings cannot pass the scrutiny of Article 72(3) of ROC Patent Law.  We cannot profess we must be right.  Also, we never surrender to evil force.  If what we think and insist in is in agreement with what the general public would like to take and believe, we will be evil if we could not succeed in making Proceedings into precedents properly applying Article 72(3) of the Patent Law.

       Deep & Far Newsletter is intended to be informative and of some kind of enlightenment.  Unless having been fully developed, any views or opinions, expressed or implied, are unnecessarily those of Deep & Far, or its attorneys or clients.

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